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Sex Offender Law and the Geography
of Victimization
Amanda Y. Agan and J.J. Prescott*

Sex offender laws that target recidivism (e.g., community notiﬁcation and residency restriction regimes) are premised—at least in part—on the idea that sex offender proximity and
victimization risk are positively correlated. We examine this relationship by combining past
and current address information of registered sex offenders (RSOs) with crime data from
Baltimore County, Maryland, to study how crime rates vary across neighborhoods with
different concentrations of resident RSOs. Contrary to the assumptions of policymakers and
the public, we ﬁnd that, all else equal, reported sex offense victimization risk is generally
(although not uniformly) lower in neighborhoods where more RSOs live. To further probe
the relationship between where RSOs live and where sex crime occurs, we consider whether
public knowledge of the identity and proximity of RSOs may make offending in those areas
more difﬁcult for (or less attractive to) all potential sex offenders. We exploit the fact that
Maryland’s registry became searchable via the Internet during our sample period to investigate how laws that publicly identify RSOs may change the relationship between the residential concentration of RSOs and neighborhood victimization risk. Surprisingly, for some
categories of sex crime, notiﬁcation appears to increase the relative risk of victimization in
neighborhoods with greater concentrations of RSOs.

I. Introduction
Understanding the relationship between where criminal offenders live and where crime
occurs is important to understanding criminal behavior and, increasingly, to the design of
effective criminal justice policies. Policymakers have recently become enamored with using
offender location information not only to track or control the movement of individuals at
risk of committing crime, but also to inform the public of the location of potential threats
so that people may be more likely to remain vigilant and even proactively protect them-
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Arbor, MI 48109; email: jprescott@umich.edu. Agan is Postdoctoral Research Associate in the Department of
Economics, Princeton University.
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to “exp(β0 + β1X)exp(β1)” in Footnote 27, and in Figure 9 the units on the y-axis have been updated.
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selves. Sex offender notiﬁcation laws in particular are designed to inform at-risk individuals
of where previously convicted, registered sex offenders (RSOs) reside. These laws assume
that (1) the risk of being victimized is positively correlated with geographic proximity to an
RSO, (2) potential victims can use RSO identifying information effectively to reduce their
risk of victimization, and (3) notiﬁcation reduces overall victimization risk near RSOs.
Sex offender registration and notiﬁcation laws rely critically on the idea that the police
and public can employ information about where RSOs reside—supposedly, the danger
zones—to prevent future crimes. For decades, policymakers have contended that providing
RSO residence information to the police, or publicizing the information via the Internet, will
reduce overall levels of RSO recidivism. The literature on the consequences of these laws,
however, suggests fairly consistently that making RSO information public fails to reduce
recidivism—and may in fact increase it (e.g., Agan 2011; Prescott & Rockoff 2011). One possible explanation for this pattern is that while publicly identifying sex offenders seems likely to
exacerbate recidivism risk factors (e.g., unemployment, poor housing, and a paucity of stable
relationships), the residence information provided to the public is not very useful to potential
victims because, for a variety of reasons, sex offenders rarely offend near their own homes.
In this article, we assemble comprehensive geographic data on crimes reported in
Baltimore County, Maryland, and a history of registered addresses of all RSOs in Maryland,
to explore the empirical interplay between sex offender residency, notiﬁcation laws, and
reported victimization risk. Our data are unique in that they contain both the current and
past home addresses of all RSOs, allowing us to create movement histories and make an
accurate count of RSOs living in a particular neighborhood at a particular time. Our
neighborhood-by-month panel runs from February 2001 through December 2008. Our
analysis also exploits a signiﬁcant and plausibly exogenous shock to Maryland’s legal regime
for regulating its convicted sex offenders. In April 2002, Maryland’s Department of Public
Safety and Correctional Services made a functional, searchable Internet registry available
for public use. RSOs, already known to the police as a result of registration requirements,
suddenly became known to the public at large during our study period.
These crime and registration data and the legal regime change allow us to study
several important policy-relevant questions. First, we examine whether areas where more
RSOs reside experience more sex crime relative to areas with fewer resident RSOs. Although
the picture is complicated, we ﬁnd evidence of a generally negative relationship: locations
with more RSOs experience relatively fewer sex offense incidents, an empirical pattern starkly
at odds with public perceptions and the key assumption underlying sex offender notiﬁcation
laws. Second, we explore whether broad public knowledge of the identity and location of
RSOs alters the relationship between the number of sex offenders living in an area and the
risk of victimization in that neighborhood, exploiting the fact that the Maryland Sex
Offender Registry became searchable online during our sample period. Unexpectedly, we
ﬁnd evidence that public awareness of resident RSOs may increase the relative number of
certain reported sex crimes in those areas with relatively more resident RSOs.
The idea that victimization risk and offender proximity are correlated emerges from
a large theoretical literature (with supporting empirical work) that examines how criminals
“journey to crime” (Rossmo 2000). According to the routine activities approach (Cohen &
Felson 1979), for instance, crime occurs when a motivated offender bumps into a suitable
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victim in a situation in which a capable guardian happens to be absent. In a similar vein, the
rational choice approach envisions an offender who selects (perhaps subconsciously) the
locations for his offenses by comparing relevant costs and beneﬁts (Cornish & Clarke 1986;
Elffers 2004). These and related environmental theories take as given that an offender’s
residence is relevant to where he will commit crime, and while patterns vary across types of
offenses and the demographic characteristics of offenders (Bernasco & Block 2009; Canter
& Gregory 1994), distance decay remains the received wisdom: offenders of all varieties
(and for intuitive reasons) generally commit fewer crimes farther from home.
But the empirical conclusion drawn by policymakers and the public that sex offenses
will occur disproportionally where RSOs reside does not follow from the fact that nearby
victims, all else equal, are easier and quicker to locate. Neither does the logic of distance
decay imply that the public announcement of where RSOs live will reduce the public’s
relative risk of victimization. These intuitive inferences are ﬂawed for two reasons. First,
while the costs and constraints of travel and unfamiliar places generally reduce crime, certain
classes of offenders may employ buffer zones between their residence and their criminal
activity (Brantingham & Brantingham 1984). Crime displacement of this sort may be
particularly relevant in the sex offender context (Duwe et al. 2008; Barr & Pease 1990).
Second, sex offender laws only operate (directly) on RSOs (i.e., those who have been
convicted in the past and are therefore known to law enforcement), yet unregistered,
ﬁrst-time sex offenders (NonRSOs) as a group commit a large majority of reported sex
offenses (e.g., Sandler et al. 2008; Moore 2006). Therefore, it stands to reason that if sex
offender laws also inﬂuence where NonRSOs choose to live and offend, victimization rates
could well be counterintuitively lower near where RSOs reside.
The article proceeds as follows. In Section II, we outline the institutional and legal
environment for our empirical work. We then explain our conceptual approach to thinking
about an offender’s decision to offend near where he lives or elsewhere, situating the discussion in the existing literature. In Section III, we introduce our data. Section IV describes our
primary empirical strategies. Section V reports and discusses our results. In Section VI, we
present extensions to and robustness checks of our analysis. We conclude in Section VII.

II. Legal Background, Conceptual Framework,
and Literature
People dread living near criminal offenders, particularly registered sex offenders (e.g.,
Aleksander 2010). The mere fact that policymakers have demanded the dissemination of
residential information of RSOs since the 1990s evinces a social belief that proximity to an
RSO increases one’s overall risk of victimization (Bandy 2011).1 Designed to make it costly

1

A plausible, but ultimately unconvincing, alternative interpretation exists: perhaps it is not that the public and
policymakers believe that proximity to RSOs results in higher victimization risk, but rather that sex offender
identifying information can allow victims, through precaution taking, to reduce the risk below what it would otherwise
be. This possibility is belied by the facts that homes near RSOs sell for less than comparable homes elsewhere and that
adjacent home values decline sharply when an RSO moves into a neighborhood (e.g., Linden & Rockoff 2006; Pope
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and difﬁcult for these potential offenders to attack victims who live nearby, particularly
children, notiﬁcation laws are founded on the idea that an RSO’s address actually reveals
where that potential offender is most likely to commit an offense in the future (Duwe et al.
2008) and that government may be able to do something about such risk by making that
information available to those who are most vulnerable.

A. Registration and Notification Laws
Sex offender registration and notiﬁcation laws spread across the country in the 1990s, a
movement sparked in part by public outrage over crimes committed by previously convicted
sex offenders and, more directly, by federal laws providing strong incentives for states to
adopt them. The Jacob Wetterling Act (1994) pressed states to build conﬁdential registries
of sex offender information, in theory giving local law enforcement the information
needed to better monitor and, if necessary, more easily apprehend convicted sex offenders.
Megan’s Law (1996) pushed states to make their private registries public, so that anyone
would be able to use sex offender registry information to identify threats and thus better
protect themselves and others. With respect to both federal laws, states had (and used)
considerable discretion in the timing and features of the registration and notiﬁcation laws
they were expected to pass.
Maryland, the source of our data, began to transform its sex offender policies in 1995
with Senate Bill 79, which proposed requiring convicted sex offenders who had victimized
children to register for 10 years with a local law enforcement agency. The bill was enacted
and implemented (Gillette 1996), ultimately codiﬁed as Md. Ann. Code Art. 27.692B.
Before the end of the 1990s, all convicted sex offenders (with the exception of a class of
offenders convicted of certain offenses committed prior to July 1, 1997) were required to
register with police, and the state had created procedures by which a citizen, in writing,
could request information about a registrant and by which a law enforcement agency, in its
discretion, could provide information in response to such requests.
In the middle of 1999, Maryland promulgated Md. Code Ann., Crim. Proc. § 11-717,
a law that provides that “[t]he Department [of Public Safety and Correctional Services] may
post on the Internet a current listing of each registrant’s name, crime, and other identifying
information” (emphasis added).2 Although the law became effective at the beginning of
October 1999, the Internet registry was not available for use until April 2002 (Md. Code
Ann., Crim. Proc. § 11-717; The Daily Record 2002). On the day the website became active

2008). These market indications suggest that perceived risk levels may be higher where convicted sex offenders reside.
Stronger evidence against this alternative possibility is that in addition to notiﬁcation laws, many states have implemented residency restrictions stipulating that RSOs cannot live within a certain distance (e.g., 1,000 feet) of schools,
community centers, and bus stops, or other places where children congregate. Here, the clear assumption is that
proximity equals risk.
2

The 1999 legislation also required that child sexual and sexually violent offenders who had committed certain
offenses as well as “sexually violent predators” register for life rather than just 10 years.
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in mid-April 2002, identifying information for all RSOs (more than 2,000) became instantly
available using a free Internet search (The Daily Record 2002).3
After that date, only small changes in the scope, duration, and procedures related to
registration and notiﬁcation followed until June 22, 2006, when Maryland implemented sex
offender residency and employment restrictions. Maryland’s residency restrictions,
however, were narrow and discretionary, nothing like what many other states have since
imposed (see Md. Code. Ann., Crim. Proc. §§ 11-722–11-724). The 2006 law allowed a
parole supervision ofﬁcer, at the discretion of the Parole Commission, to subject a registered offender to certain restrictions on where he or she could live. Anecdotal evidence
suggests that this option was rarely used (Cunningham 2009). Given that the law was
enacted in the last few years of our sample, and because it appears to have affected so few
registered offenders, it is unlikely to confound our analyses or conclusions.
B. Conceptual Framework
With just a few exceptions, the theoretical and empirical research on the geography of sex
offending behavior, which we describe brieﬂy in Section II.C, has focused on the distance
offenders are likely to travel when they seek to commit sex crime and what factors contribute to the selection of a particular location. The central difference between these questions
and the questions we examine in this article—whether neighborhoods with
more RSOs experience more sex crime and whether this relationship is different if RSOs
are known only to the police or also to the public at large—is the recognition that
registration and notiﬁcation laws may cause not only RSOs but also NonRSOs to engage in
very different spatial patterns of criminal activity and, as groups, even to live apart from
each other. Below, to frame our empirical work, we develop this idea in more detail,
beginning by asking the foundational question of what drives an offender to choose a
particular location to commit a crime.
We assume that both RSOs and NonRSOs choose whether and where (or against
whom) to commit a sex offense by consciously or subconsciously weighing the costs and
beneﬁts of their options. For simplicity, we also assume that RSOs and NonRSOs beneﬁt
equally on average from committing crime and that the punishment for any offense, if the
offender is caught and convicted, does not depend on the offense’s location. As a result,
conditional on deciding to commit a crime, an offender will select a location on the basis
of (1) the relative probability that the offender will be caught (and convicted) at the
location and (2) the difﬁculty of traveling to and carrying out the crime at the location. As
we show below, both considerations may be heavily inﬂuenced by whether registration or
notiﬁcation laws are in place in the jurisdiction and, if so, whether the incipient offender
in question is subject to them.

3

Our research suggests that because the 1999 statute used permissive language (“may,” not “shall”), the Maryland
Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services chose to conduct a feasibility study and receive public
comments before deciding whether to make registry information available electronically. Once the Department
determined to proceed with an Internet registry, the political branches had to allocate funding for the upfront and
yearly maintenance costs, the website and related procedures had to be developed, and so forth (Seergae 2014; The
Daily Record 2002).
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In the abstract, travel costs and the difﬁculty level of locating an appropriate victim
and of committing a sex crime are increasing in the distance from the offender’s home.
Traveling is costly and takes time, and unfamiliar locations make successfully planning and
carrying out crime more difﬁcult. But, consistent with the notion of buffer zones, we also
posit that the probability that a sex offender is identiﬁed and apprehended is decreasing in
the crime’s distance from the offender’s home, making the overall attractiveness of offending near one’s home unclear. Evidence from existing literature (see Section II.C), at least,
suggests that buffer zones in the sex offense context are signiﬁcant in size.
Against this backdrop, sex offender laws seem likely to dramatically increase the
attractiveness to RSOs of offending away from home. Registration laws require RSOs (but
only RSOs) to provide local authorities with their addresses and other identifying information, increasing the relative probability that an RSO will be apprehended if he offends in his
neighborhood. Notiﬁcation laws magnify this effect by making this registration information
available to the public, increasing the likelihood that an RSO will be identiﬁed by a victim
or a witness and, as a result, apprehended if he attempts to commit a crime in his
neighborhood. Furthermore, notiﬁcation information allows potential victims to better
protect themselves from attack by RSOs who live nearby, making it more difﬁcult for an
RSO to carry out a crime near home.
These consequences seem to imply that victimization risk will be relatively low for the
neighbors of RSOs under these laws. Such a pattern would appear consistent with registration and notiﬁcation laws displacing RSO sex crime or even reducing RSO recidivism.
However, this analysis ignores the threat posed by NonRSOs, and therefore conﬂates overall
victimization risk with the risk of being victimized by a nearby RSO.4 Most reported sex crime
is committed by NonRSOs (Sandler et al. 2008), so overall victimization risk near RSO
homes will depend critically on the behavior of NonRSOs and, in particular, on whether
these individuals become more likely or less likely (or neither) to offend near RSO homes
when registration and notiﬁcation laws are in place.
Although registration and notiﬁcation laws apply only to RSOs, the information
provided by these laws (as well as the behavioral responses of the police and victims to this
information) may inﬂuence the locational offending choices of all potential sex offenders.
These inﬂuences may interact in offsetting or compounding ways that may ultimately
render the vicinity immediately adjacent to RSO homes either safer or more dangerous
than elsewhere. For instance, NonRSOs may ﬁnd areas where RSOs live to be less attractive
as places to commit crime (perhaps because potential victims living there are more cautious, despite Bandy’s (2011) evidence to the contrary) or, alternatively, NonRSOs may ﬁnd
them to be more attractive (perhaps because law enforcement attention is directed to the
“usual suspects”—i.e., RSOs—in the area). Furthermore, if NonRSOs avoid targeting areas
where RSOs are known to reside, the costs of travel, unfamiliarity, and time may cause

4

The risk of being victimized by a nearby RSO might be lower for someone who lives a building away from the RSO
in question relative to a potential victim who lives a mile away. But, if we assume RSOs are evenly distributed across
neighborhoods and hold all else equal, the overall risk of being victimized by an RSO should not vary geographically.
Thus, whether buffer zones and sex offender laws reduce overall victimization risk near where RSOs live may turn on
the spatial distribution of these RSO homes.
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NonRSOs to consciously or otherwise live apart from RSOs so they may more easily reach
places with fewer “capable guardians” and more “suitable targets” (Cohen & Felson 1979).
Walker et al. (2001) ﬁnd evidence that sex offenders tend to live closer to concentrated
populations of potential victims, suggesting that the spatial distribution of sex offender
homes (in this case, all sex offender homes) may matter a great deal to whether victimization risk is higher or lower for neighbors of RSOs.
With the addition of unknown offenders to the analysis, the possible consequences of
sex offender laws for victimization risk levels near RSO homes become more complicated.
In fact, notiﬁcation’s effects on the relative level of victimization risk in neighborhoods with
more RSOs may not only differ in magnitude but may also point in a different direction
than a law that simply requires convicted offenders to register with the police.
Registration policy, through heightened police monitoring, increases the probability
that an RSO is caught for crimes perpetrated near his home, potentially displacing or
deterring offenses he might otherwise have committed. Registration, however, seems
unlikely to affect NonRSO spatial patterns of offending.5 In theory, if RSOs are more likely
to travel, every neighborhood RSO could be replaced by one traveling from another
neighborhood, leaving the relative victimization risk everywhere unchanged. By contrast, if
RSOs tend to cluster, longer journeys to crime caused by registration would result in
below-average victimization risk near the homes of RSOs as more RSOs leave the neighborhood to offend than arrive.
Notiﬁcation further complicates these dynamics. If anyone can search online for the
whereabouts of RSOs, the behavior of potential victims, RSOs, and NonRSOs may all
change, leading to ambiguous consequences for RSO neighborhoods. On one hand, RSOs,
once publicly known, seem even more likely to offend outside of their neighborhoods.
Individuals living in neighborhoods with RSOs may undertake more precautions and may
monitor their neighborhoods more effectively (or at least be more likely to report crimes).
On the other hand, notiﬁcation could make offending more attractive to RSOs across the
board (either by exacerbating recidivism risk factors like unemployment or by reducing the
effective severity of punishment). If victim precaution taking is relatively ineffectual and
travel is difﬁcult, RSOs may become more likely to attack near home. For their part,
NonRSOs may now use notiﬁcation information (or signs of victim precaution taking) to
seek out particular neighborhoods—either with more or fewer RSOs—to reduce their own
probability of detection. If RSO neighborhoods become more attractive targets to
NonRSOs because the police are likely to focus any investigation on RSOs or because victim
precautions against RSOs make them more vulnerable to NonRSO offenses, relative victimization risk could increase near RSO homes.
The relative importance of these effects and thus the consequences of registration
and notiﬁcation laws are likely to vary (potentially nonlinearly) with the total number of RSOs
in a neighborhood. For NonRSOs, the probability of being caught may be decreasing in the

5

The threat of future registration might deter some NonRSOs from offending, although there will be little effect on
the geography of their crimes because these NonRSOs are by assumption unaware of where RSOs live. Prescott and
Rockoff (2011) ﬁnd no evidence of deterrence. Similarly, under a registration regime, victims remain unaware of
whether they live near an RSO, and so victim behavior will also not affect NonRSO offending patterns.
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total number of RSOs in a neighborhood because there may be safety (from apprehension)
in crowds: policing may be more costly or difﬁcult, and therefore less effective at the
margin, wherever the proportion of local RSOs is high. Alternatively, if information about
the identities (and number) of RSOs in a neighborhood is made public, the difﬁculty of
ﬁnding a suitable victim (because of additional precaution taking) may increase with the
total number of RSOs, reducing the relative attractiveness of high-RSO locations to
NonRSOs as places to commit crime.
Importantly, the relative costs and beneﬁts of offending in an RSO neighborhood,
and the effects of registration and notiﬁcation laws on the decision where to offend
generally, may vary for different types of sex offenses. Some sex offenses are unlikely to be
affected by victim precaution taking or reporting, but are very likely to be responsive to
police monitoring (e.g., prostitution and pornography). Child sex offenses occur more
often between adults and children who know each other; thus, geographic closeness is an
especially salient aspect of such crimes. Certain categories of sex crimes may be more
impulsive on average, while others may involve more planning behavior. As a consequence
of these differences and the theoretically ambiguous predictions of our conceptual framework, it seems plausible that relative victimization risk near RSOs may be higher for some
crimes and lower for others, and that the implementation of notiﬁcation may increase this
risk for some crimes and reduce it for others.
On the whole, and assuming some residential clustering of sex offenders, our conceptual framework suggests that relative sex offense victimization risk ought to be lower (on
average) near RSO addresses under a registration regime. The effects of Internet notiﬁcation on relative victimization risk near RSO homes, however, are more difﬁcult to predict.
Moreover, the nature of any relationship may differ depending on the number of nearby
RSOs and the type of sex offense under consideration. In Section III and beyond, we
explore these possibilities with our data.
C. Existing Literature
Little work has directly addressed whether neighborhoods with more RSOs actually experience more sex crime or whether neighbors of RSOs are more at risk of victimization after
controlling for potentially confounding neighborhood characteristics. The effect of sex
offender notiﬁcation laws on this relationship has also received scant attention. Given the
social costs of sex offender laws, a systematic assessment of whether RSO residency is
correlated with victimization risk seems essential. The dearth of research on these basic
relationships is even more surprising in light of the fact that in deciding where (and where
not) to reside, many thousands of people per day appear to use whether there are nearby
RSOs as a proxy for the relative sex offense victimization risk of a neighborhood.
A few papers have made strides on these questions, however. Agan (2011) attempts a
version of this analysis with Washington, DC, data. Unfortunately, she only has a snapshot
of the current registry (post-notiﬁcation) and thus has to make strong assumptions, including that RSOs did not move over time, something we know from the Maryland data is
unlikely to be true. She ﬁnds no statistically signiﬁcant relationship between the number of
RSOs in a Census block group (CBG) and crime, both before (using her stable residency
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assumption) and after DC implemented online community notiﬁcation. Another paper,
Tewksbury et al. (2008), uses cross-sectional data from Jefferson County, Kentucky, and
ﬁnds no statistically signiﬁcant relationship between the number of RSOs in large Census
tracts and the frequency of sex crime during a single year.
We improve on and extend this small literature by studying much richer panel data
containing current and past addresses and precise crime locations over time, by employing
diverse methods and approaches, and by more rigorously exploring the effect of notiﬁcation on the relationship between the number of RSOs in a neighborhood and the
neighborhood’s relative risk level for different categories of sex crime.
Even in the absence of sex offender laws (or in a world in which these laws have no
behavioral consequences), research suggests that relative victimization rates may still be
lower than average near where RSOs live if buffer zones more than compensate for distance
decay in the areas near RSOs that we consider at risk. The evidence that emerges from the
journey-to-crime research makes clear that this is an open empirical question.
Warren et al. (1998:55), for instance, identify an “area around the important anchor
point of the offender’s home that contains a lower probability of rape behavior.” In their
data, offenders traveled 3.14 miles to commit a crime on average; offenders with more
extensive criminal histories (i.e., convicted offenders), however, tended to travel farther,
perhaps because they were more wary of detection. The buffer zone, the “space over which
offending becomes more probable as the distance from home increases,” was also over three
miles, a range outside what most people appear to consider the typical at-risk zone, at least
according to hedonic evidence from housing markets (see, e.g., Linden & Rockoff
2006:1121). Even more telling is the fact that four out of the ﬁve searchable distances
available on Maryland’s current Internet registry would fall within (one-quarter, one-half,
one, three, and ﬁve miles) this buffer zone.
Davies and Dale (1996) and Canter (1996), among others, similarly ﬁnd evidence of
offenders employing buffer zones.6 Duwe et al., citing some of this same evidence and
presenting their own, contend that “for violent offenders (including sex offenders), [the
distance decay] pattern typically does not hold. Confrontational offenders—who actually
encounter their victims personally—seek offending locations where they are unlikely to be
recognized (and therefore apprehended)” (2008:487). In the context of their recidivist sex
offender data from Minnesota, they report that:
Even when offenders established direct contact with victims, they were unlikely to do so close to
where they lived. . . . largely because of the fact that offenders are more likely to be recognized

6

Davies and Dale ﬁnd that 75 percent of attacks by stranger rapists took place within ﬁve miles of the offender’s home,
but they also conclude that as many rapes occurred outside of ﬁve miles as occurred within 0.5 miles, suggesting highly
dispersed recidivism patterns. Moreover, they report evidence that hints at displacement, noting that one offender,
“having realized that the police suspected him of a rape, . . . signiﬁcantly increased the length of the journey to areas
where he prowled, escaping arrest for some considerable time” (1996:153–54). Canter studies serial rapists in
London. He interprets his data as favoring a marauder model of behavior (in which the attacker travels from a single
base, usually the residence, typically moving out from that base in a circle), but also ﬁnds that “[t]he average
minimum distance of crime to home for these offenders was 1.53 miles. . . . There is . . . strong evidence for a
minimum distance that the sexual offender is willing to travel from home, in accordance with the hypothesised desire
to be at a safe distance away from home. The criminal’s ‘safe area’ for activity . . . is at least 0.61 miles from home”
(1996:224–25).
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within their own neighborhoods [citing Levenson & Cotter 2005]. [W]hen direct-contact offenders look for a victim, they may be more likely to go to an area relatively close to home (i.e., less
than 20 miles) but still far enough away (i.e., greater than 1 mile) to decrease the chances of being
recognized. These ﬁndings ﬁt with previous research showing that repeat sex offenders typically
offend outside their immediate neighborhoods (2008:500).7

For the same reason distance decay does not imply that sex offense victimization risk
should be higher near registered offenders, buffer zones, even large ones, do not imply that
this risk will be lower. Sex offense risk does not arise solely from the possibility of recidivism
(indeed, recidivism makes up a small portion of total victimization risk), and if the residency
decisions of RSOs provide information about the residency or offending patterns of
NonRSOs, or sex offender laws change the behavior of these groups in complicated ways,
many potential outcomes are possible.

III. Data Sources
We combine data on the history of registered offenders’ addresses from Maryland, crime
locations from Baltimore County, and the history of Maryland sex offender laws (discussed
in Section II.A) to study two key questions that emerge from our conceptual framework:8
(1) whether victimization risk is relatively high in neighborhoods with more RSOs, and (2)
whether this relationship changes if information about RSOs previously known only to the
police is made available to the public as the result of a notiﬁcation law. These questions
have policy signiﬁcance because notiﬁcation proponents contend that publicly identifying
RSOs allows potential victims to counter the assumed-to-be elevated levels of risk through
avoidance behavior, reducing victimization risk near where RSOs live.
A. Registered Sex Offender Address Data
Our approach to examining these questions requires the home addresses of RSOs in a
particular jurisdiction, and not just where those offenders live presently, but a record of when
and where they lived over a signiﬁcant period of time.9 From the Maryland Sex Offender

7

Duwe et al. (2008) studied sex offenders who were already required to register. Whether NonRSOs have similar
behavioral patterns is uncertain, as our conceptual framework illustrates.

8

To evaluate our conceptual framework directly, we would need home address information for all RSOs and
NonRSOs as well as data describing the locations at which these speciﬁc individuals committed crime. Data of this
kind are unavailable. Even if we were to limit our analysis to criminal activity reported to law enforcement, obtaining
reliable information on where a ﬁrst-time offender lived or worked at the time he committed his crime—even when
the individual is arrested, charged, and convicted—is almost always out of reach for researchers.

9

Maryland also requires that RSOs register any work address; however, we do not include those addresses (or the role
they might play) in our analysis. The primary reason for this choice is that, at least in the data we were able to acquire,
there are simply too few of them. Of all the addresses we received for the State of Maryland, fewer than 5 percent were
“work” addresses—fewer than 2,000 in the entire state over our full sample period—presumably because many RSOs
are unemployed. Only a few hundred of these work addresses are likely to have been in Baltimore County. In addition,
our data tell us nothing about the nature of any reported employment (i.e., whether the employment was part time,
full time, or seasonal) or whether an RSO’s duties were actually performed at the address registered. Nevertheless,
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Registry Unit, we obtained (via a Public Information Act request) all known current and past
addresses for all sex offenders ever registered in the State of Maryland,10 the date on which a
new address was registered, the offender’s name, the offender’s date of birth, and the
offender’s date of ﬁrst registration. The address data are left censored at February 2,
2001—the date on which the Unit began using its current electronic system for tracking
offenders—and so all our analyses take early 2001 as a starting point.11 We received the data
in October 2010, and the last report date included occurred on July 8, 2010.
The historical address data for registered offenders for the entire State of Maryland
include 9,146 RSOs and 46,193 total address reports (i.e., either an address or an indication
that an offender had been incarcerated, had become homeless, or that prior information
had been determined to no longer be current). Over 1,542 offenders report having lived in
Baltimore County for at least some time (while not in detention) with a total of 4,123 valid
(nondetention) address reports from that jurisdiction.12 Sex offenders in our Baltimore
County data have an average of 2.67 address reports,13 a number consistent with research
indicating that sex offenders change residences frequently and are more likely to be
homeless (Duwe et al. 2008; Mustaine et al. 2006a, 2006b).
B. Sex Offense and Other Crime Data
From Baltimore County’s police department,14 we procured all known federal Uniform
Crime Report Part I crimes and Part II sex offenses reported to law enforcement from the
early 1990s through part of 2009.15 Part I crimes include aggravated assault, forcible rape,
murder, robbery, burglary, larceny (theft), motor vehicle theft, and arson. Part II sex offenses

routine activity theory and common sense highlight the potential importance of where RSOs spend their time during
the day in understanding offending patterns, and we are hopeful that future research will examine this possible
association.
10

Maryland was unique among the states that we contacted in that it maintained and allowed dissemination to
researchers through Public Information Act requests the current address and all past addresses of the state’s RSOs.

11

More precisely, we have each registered offender’s residential address information as of February 2001 and
movement information for any RSO from that month until July 2010, but we have no information on where any
offenders lived prior to early 2001.

12

By valid, we mean that after cleaning, we were able to match 4,123 of the registered offender addresses that appear
to be in Baltimore County to actual residential locations using GIS software, a match rate well over 80 percent. In
Figure 2, we plot all Baltimore County matched addresses, including detention facility reports, which total to 4,988
points. See our Online Appendix for more details.

13

Our panel of registered offender addresses is unbalanced. Although a number of offenders were present in the data
as of February 2001, many entered over the course of our nine-year sample, so the 2.67 average applies to the
shorter-than-nine-year average registration period of RSOs in our sex offender address data.

14

Baltimore County surrounds Baltimore City but does not include it. Our data therefore do not include crimes
reported in Baltimore City.

15

The crime data we received for part of 2009 were only partially complete, and we determined they were not reliable.
As a result, our analysis sample only includes data through the end of 2008.
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include sex offenses against adult victims (ﬁrst through fourth degree), sex offenses against
child victims (ﬁrst through fourth degree), peeping tom violations, pornography offenses,
prostitution crimes, and, ﬁnally, child abuse and statutory rape.16 In addition to the type of
offense, we know the date, time, and exact location of the incident report.
The dependent variable in our analyses is the number of crimes in a neighborhood
during a month, with the number of sex offenses being the main outcome of interest. In
addition to studying the total number of sex offenses, we group sex offenses into
ﬁve other (overlapping) categories in order to further investigate our baseline ﬁndings:
(1) rape (Part I) offenses, (2) all nonrape (Part II) sex offenses, (3) sex offenses against adults
(excluding rape), (4) sex offenses against children, and (5) peeping, pornography, and
prostitution (PPP). We also group other crimes into violent crimes (aggravated assault, murder,
and robbery) and nonviolent crimes (burglary, theft, motor vehicle theft, and arson). We use
counts of these offenses as alternative outcome variables to see if additional RSO residents are
associated with changes in crime in the neighborhood generally (and also as controls in
unreported analyses) to ensure that general trends in crime do not drive our ﬁndings.
C. Additional Control Variables
All our regressions account for neighborhood characteristics that are ﬁxed over time, for
seasonal patterns, and for general time trends. To address the possibility of demographic
changes within neighborhoods over time and, potentially, for the availability of certain types of
victims during the day, we incorporate into our work annual Baltimore County elementary
school demographic information.17 To capture changing levels of neighborhood poverty and
other forms of social disorganization, we use the percentage of students enrolled at neighborhood schools who were eligible to receive reduced-price or free lunches. In our Census block
group analyses, to measure possibly changing neighborhood demographics (particularly the
possibility that RSOs live in neighborhoods with few children or with family structures that are
different in potentially confounding ways), we include the ratio of pre-K through ﬁfth-grade
students enrolled in neighborhood schools (not necessarily residents) to the total population
of the neighborhood (using 2000 Decennial Census data).
D. Geocoding the Data
To geocode the RSO address and crime location information,18 we employed a composite
address locator to match each address to a set of latitude and longitude points. (For a
16

In our analysis, we do not consider (consensual) statutory rape or child abuse because these crimes are not the focus
of sex offender laws. There are very few of these crimes in our data, in any event, and their exclusion does not affect
any of our results.

17

We assembled these data for the years 2000 through 2009 by using the Public Elementary/Secondary School
Universe Survey, created by the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES), which is available online at:
<http://nces.ed.gov/ccd/pubschuniv.asp>.

18

We also geocode each of the public schools in Baltimore County to build our school demographics control variables.
We have annual data, which we attribute to each month of the academic school year, which runs from August 1
through July 31 of each year.
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complete description of this work, please see our Online Appendix.) We used these
coordinates to calculate distances and also placed each set of coordinates into a neighborhood. For example, in our main set of analyses, we locate each RSO residence and each
crime in a Census block group (CBG), a geographic unit deﬁned by the U.S. Census
Bureau.19 There were 498 CBGs in Baltimore County in 2000, each one an aggregation of
Census blocks and each with a population of between 600 and 3,000 individuals. CBGs are
the smallest geographic unit for which Decennial Census information is available from the
Census Bureau and constitute our primary deﬁnition of a neighborhood. Figure 1 shows

Figure 1: Baltimore County Census block groups (CBGs).

Source: 2009 TIGER/Line Shapeﬁles—Baltimore County Census Blocks.

19

We also consider other neighborhood deﬁnitions—including voting districts, zip codes, and the area within one
mile from random addresses—and proceed in the same way. We explain these alternative deﬁnitions in Sections IV
and VI.
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Baltimore County RSO addresses (Feb. 2001 through Dec. 2008).

Notes: All matched Baltimore County RSO addresses (4,988) are depicted. In our analysis, we remove detention
facility addresses, resulting in a ﬁnal tally of 4,123 RSO addresses.
Source: Maryland Sex Offender Registry Unit.

the borders of all CBGs in Baltimore County (more dense areas result in smaller CBGs) in
2000. Figure 2 illustrates the approximate geographic distribution of RSO residences
during our sample period.
Matching RSO residences and crimes to neighborhoods allows us to create a
neighborhood-level panel data set spanning 95 months (February 2001 through
December 2008). The data include the number of RSOs who live in the neighborhood
during that month, annual school enrollment and free lunch information, and the
number of crimes that occur in that month, broken down into (1) all sex offenses, (2)
(other) violent crimes, and (3) nonviolent crimes, with all sex offenses further broken
down into the following (overlapping) groups of crimes: (a) rape, (b) all nonrape sex
offenses, (c) sex offenses against adults, (d) sex offenses against children, and (e)
peeping, pornography, and prostitution (PPP) crimes. The matching process was complicated by the fact that RSOs do not necessarily move at month intervals, and so we
assigned an RSO to a neighborhood only for the fraction of the month he lived
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Figure 3: Number of RSOs per CBG-month (Baltimore County, Feb. 2001–Dec. 2008).
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there.20 Accordingly, our monthly neighborhood RSO counts often include fractions of
offenders.
Figures 3 and 4 show the distribution of RSOs (rounded to the nearest offender)
across CBG-month cells and across years. In Table 1, we report basic summary statistics of
our data by CBG-month. We include the overall mean for all CBG-months, the mean for
those CBG-months in which the RSO count was above zero, and the mean for those
CBG-months in which the RSO count was zero.21 In our sample, there is roughly one RSO
per Census block group on average, and one sex offense occurs in every CBG approximately
every 10 months. Not surprisingly, both violent and nonviolent crimes are more common
than sex offenses.
One striking association in Table 1 is that CBGs with more RSOs experience much
more sex crime than other neighborhoods. This is a misleading comparison, however,
because RSO neighborhoods also suffer disproportionally from other forms of violent and
nonviolent crime—almost twice as much violent crime and over 50 percent more nonvio-

20

To clarify with an example: an offender who lives in neighborhood A from June 1, 2002, to June 10, 2002, and then
in neighborhood B from June 10, 2002, until the end of the sample would be counted as 10/30 (1/3) in neighborhood A and 20/30 (2/3) in neighborhood B for June 2002.

21

If we weight the data by population using numbers from the 2000 Decennial Census, the summary statistics of our
sample change little. This is not surprising, as CBGs are designed to cover geographic areas that contain roughly the
same number of people.
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Number of RSOs per CBG-month by year (Baltimore County, Feb. 2001–Dec.
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Source: Maryland Sex Offender Registry Unit.

lent crime. Neighborhoods with RSOs are also more likely to have higher percentages of
enrolled students who are eligible for free or reduced-price lunches and more pre-K to
ﬁfth-grade students enrolled relative to the total population. These differences between
CBGs where RSOs live and where they do not live illustrate why simple demographic
comparisons are insufﬁcient to identify the true relationship between neighborhood
victimization risk and the number of resident RSOs and, further, they underline the
importance of including neighborhood ﬁxed effects in any analysis.

IV. Empirical Strategy
Using the data described in Section III, we can better understand (1) whether neighborhoods with relatively more RSOs in residence experience more reported crime (i.e., whether
victimization risk—from whatever source—is higher near the residences of RSOs than it is
elsewhere) and (2) whether there is any evidence that this residency-risk relationship
changes in response to the implementation of a searchable Internet notiﬁcation regime. Any
evidence on these questions will lead to many additional questions about underlying
mechanisms as well as deeper questions about basic drivers of criminal sexual behavior.22

22

For example, if Internet notiﬁcation were to lead to relatively less risk in neighborhoods with RSOs, the reduction
could be the result of more effective victim avoidance behavior, but such evidence would also be consistent with other
hypotheses, including the possibility that NonRSOs choose to avoid areas where publicly known RSOs reside.
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Summary Statistics (Census Block Group by Month Cells)
(1)
All
CBG-Months

(2)
CBG-Months
With Resident
RSOs

(3)
CBG-Months
Without Resident
RSOs

Number of Resident RSOs

1.021
(1.45)

1.999
(1.48)

0.000
(0.00)

Sex Offenses Reported

0.106
(0.35)
0.023
(0.16)
0.083
(0.31)
0.049
(0.23)
0.023
(0.16)
0.011
(0.12)

0.136
(0.40)
0.031
(0.18)
0.106
(0.35)
0.063
(0.26)
0.030
(0.18)
0.013
(0.12)

0.074
(0.30)
0.016
(0.13)
0.059
(0.27)
0.034
(0.20)
0.016
(0.13)
0.009
(0.12)

Violent Crimes Reported

0.688
(1.10)

0.903
(1.24)

0.463
(0.88)

Nonviolent Crimes Reported

3.725
(4.91)

4.494
(5.37)

2.922
(4.24)

% Students Eligible for
Free/Reduced-Price Lunch

8.992
(18.52)

12.587
(21.86)

5.235
(13.21)

% Tot Pop of Pre-K to 5th
Grade Enrolled

6.819
(15.34)

7.717
(15.55)

5.881
(15.06)

No. of Observations

47,310

24,171

23,139

Rape
All Nonrape Sex Offenses
Sex Offenses Against Adults
(not including rape)
Sex Offenses Against Children
Peeping, Pornography, and
Prostitution

Notes: Column (1) displays averages and standard deviations (in parentheses) for our sample of Census-blockgroup-months. Columns (2) and (3) show averages and standard deviations for those CBG-months in which at least
one registered sex offender (RSO) lived in the neighborhood for part of the month and for those CBG-months in
which no RSO lived in the neighborhood during the month, respectively.

Nevertheless, both research questions have great relevance for how best to manage convicted
sex offenders after they are released and, at present, surprisingly little evidence exists that
addresses either question.
To identify and measure the relationship between where sex offenders live and where
sex crime occurs, we implement a conditional ﬁxed effects Poisson regression estimated via
quasi-maximum likelihood.23 For our purposes, the outcome of interest is the number of

23

There is debate in the literature about the appropriate regression technique for count data, but the conditional
ﬁxed effects Poisson model with robust (sandwich) standard errors is robust to overdispersion, excessive zeros, and
serial correlation (see, e.g., Bertanha & Moser (2014) and the citations therein). Implementing ﬁxed effects in a
negative binomial analysis, the obvious alternative approach, is not trivial—see Greene (2005), and Allison and
Waterman (2002). Nevertheless, we also ran negative binomial versions of these regressions, adding in dummy
equivalents of the ﬁxed effects in an unconditional model. These results are qualitatively and quantitatively similar,
and are available upon request.
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criminal incidents in a neighborhood in a given month, and the number of RSOs in that
neighborhood during the same time period serves as the key independent variable. Speciﬁcally, we estimate:

E(Yilt |X lt ) = exp(β0 + β1RSOlt + β2RSOlt2 + β3X lt + δ l + α y + αm ).

(1)

Yilt represents the number of incidents of crime type i (e.g., sex crime, violent crime,
nonviolent crime, etc.) occurring in neighborhood l in month t. RSOlt is the number of
registered sex offenders living in neighborhood l in month t.
One concern with our framework is that RSOs, for ﬁnancial or other reasons, may
live disproportionately in neighborhoods with unusual levels of offending behavior; such
selection could generate a spurious correlation between RSO residency and crime.
Accordingly, we apply a neighborhood ﬁxed effects analysis that accounts for timeinvariant characteristics of neighborhoods that may inﬂuence crime rates. In addition,
year and month ﬁxed effects (αy, αm) are included to account for any period- or seasonspeciﬁc county-wide changes (like new state laws). Another concern is that RSOs may also
move into neighborhoods that are in the process of declining—and this would not be
captured by our ﬁxed effects analysis.24 To address the possibility of RSOs moving to
neighborhoods whose characteristics were changing in a way that may affect offense
patterns, we include two time-varying controls (Xlt)—the fraction of students in
neighborhood schools eligible for free and reduced-price lunches and the ratio of pre-K
to ﬁfth-grade students enrolled in neighborhood schools to the neighborhood’s total
population (in 2000).
As we describe in Section II.B, the effect of an additional RSO on RSO, NonRSO,
and victim behavior (and therefore levels of reported criminal activity) may be
nonlinear—that is, the consequences may depend on how many RSOs already reside in
the neighborhood. A neighborhood moving from zero to one RSO might evolve in a very
different fashion than one that moves from one to two or two to three. Once an individual learns that a single sex offender lives in her neighborhood, for example, it may not
matter how many additional RSOs live in the neighborhood if the potential victim is
engaging fully in precautionary avoidance behavior. We address the possibility of this
nonlinearity in two ways. In our main speciﬁcations, we include the squared number of
RSOs (RSOlt2 ) in a neighborhood as a regressor. Because the use of a squared term
assumes that any nonlinearity takes a particular form, we also proceed nonparametrically
in Section VI.A by separately considering the effects of having at most one, one to three,
or more than three RSOs.25

24

Consider one possibility: RSOs decide to move into a neighborhood and all families with children move away or,
alternatively, because a neighborhood is in decline, it becomes a more affordable place for RSOs to live. Although sex
offenders do tend to live in neighborhoods that are more socially disorganized and have higher poverty levels,
neighborhood decline appears to happen more slowly (especially when we control for ﬁxed changes across all
neighborhoods, as might happen in a recession).

25

As we note in Section III.D, RSOs may move into and out of neighborhoods during a month. As a result, it is possible
for a neighborhood to have “less than one” but more than zero RSOs in a given month.
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To ease interpretation, we report all Poisson results in our tables as exponentiated
coefﬁcients, also known as incidence rate ratios (IRR).26 An IRR has a multiplicative
interpretation: a one unit increase in the independent variable (e.g., the number of
RSOs) is associated with exp(β) times as much of the dependent variable (e.g., the
number of offenses).27 Our tables also present cluster-robust sandwich standard errors,
which are not sensitive to overdispersion, excessive zeros, or serial correlation (see,
e.g., Cameron & Trivedi 2009). Spatial correlation in the error term across neighborhoods can also pose a threat to correctly estimating standard errors, however. Unobservable shocks that affect crime rates (such as gang activity, police concentration, economic
vitality, and local geographic attributes) are likely to be correlated across space in ways
not fully captured by neighborhood boundaries. Fortunately, spatial correlation does not
appear to be a problem in our work, and explicitly accounting for it leaves our ﬁndings
unchanged.28
Because the implementation of notiﬁcation may alter the behavior of NonRSOs,
RSOs, and potential victims, it may also transform the geographic relationship between
where RSOs live and where sex crime occurs. If notiﬁcation laws are relevant to the geographic distribution of sex offense victimization risk—that is, if revealing identifying information about convicted sex offenders changes the criminal activity landscape in a way that
either harms or beneﬁts local victims—our empirical strategy has the potential to provide
evidence in support of one of these possibilities. Assuming the arrival of the new information environment was exogenous to the decisions of sex offenders to commit crime (a case
we make in Section II.A), a causal story can be told about the change in any relationship we
ﬁnd using Equation (1).29
To identify the relationship between notiﬁcation and victimization risk in RSO
neighborhoods, we introduce an indicator for whether the Internet sex offender registry

26
The raw Poisson coefﬁcients of interest (β1 and β2) are complicated to interpret—in no small part because of
interaction terms, including our squared independent variable (RSOlt2 ).
27
To see this mathematically, consider the basic Poisson regression E(Y |X) = exp(β0 + β1X). If we add one
additional unit of X then E(Y |X = X + 1) = exp(β0 + β1(X + 1)) = exp(β0 + β1X + β1) = exp(β0 + β1X)exp(β1) =
E(Y |X)exp(β1). Thus, an IRR of 1 is analogous to ﬁnding no association (β = 0 in an OLS setting), an IRR greater
than 1 implies a positive association, and an IRR less than 1 implies a negative association. To be more precise, an
IRR of 1.50 indicates that a one unit increase in the value of the independent variable will result in 50 percent
more incidents. In the context of this article, an IRR of 0.90 for β1 indicates that a neighborhood with one
additional RSO would have only 90 percent of the crime incidents in question when compared to a neighborhood
with one fewer RSO. Our Online Appendix includes a more thorough explanation of the interpretation of Poisson
IRRs, including how to interpret the squared term (and the interaction terms we introduce below).

28

Bertanha and Moser (2014) show that, so long as any spatial correlation is time invariant, the conditional ﬁxed
effects Poisson model will give consistent estimates with robust (sandwich) standard errors. Using their suggested test
statistic, we examine whether any spatial correlation in our error terms may vary over time. We are unable to reject
the null of time invariance. Bertanha and Moser (2014) also provide code for estimating standard errors in the
presence of time-variant spatial correlation. For our estimates of the test statistic as well as standard errors that take
into account any time-varying spatial correlation, see our Online Appendix.

29

We see no trends (in our relatively short preperiod) that indicate atypical residential movement on the part of RSOs
prior to the publication of these data on the Internet, nor do we see a spike in offenses around that time.
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(which came online in April 2002) was available and then interact this variable with our
RSO measures. The interaction terms capture how the relationship between the number of
RSOs and crime in a neighborhood changes in response to the public being made aware of
the whereabouts of RSOs. We estimate:

E(Yilt |X lt ) = exp(β0 + β1RSOlt + β2RSOlt2 + β3Internett + β4RSOlt ∗ Internett
+ β5RSOlt2 ∗ Internett + β6X lt + δ l + α y + αm ),

(2)

where, for example, the coefﬁcient β4 will capture how the relationship between the
number of sex offenders and the frequency of crime incidents in a neighborhood changes
after registry contents are disclosed via the Internet.
Interpreting interaction coefﬁcients in a nonlinear modeling environment like
Poisson is nontrivial. Ai and Norton (2003) highlight the fact that the magnitude of any
interaction term does not easily map to its marginal effect and that the coefﬁcient and the
marginal effect can even be of opposite sign. With an IRR transformation of the coefﬁcients, however, the interpretation of an interaction term is relatively straightforward
(Buis 2010; Doidge et al. 2013). The IRR on an interaction term is also interpreted multiplicatively, but in a way that requires some explanation. Speciﬁcally, the coefﬁcient on
the interaction term is interpreted as an exp(β) times larger effect as compared to the
main effect. To make this more concrete, an IRR (exp(β1)) of 0.90 on β1 and an IRR
(exp(β4)) of 1.05 on β4 in the model above would indicate that neighborhoods with one
additional RSO after Internet notiﬁcation would experience 1.05 times as much crime
as those neighborhoods with one additional sex offender before Internet notiﬁcation. In
this example, the total effect of one additional RSO post-notiﬁcation is thus
exp(β1) × exp(β4) = 0.945.30
One important methodological question concerns how we deﬁne a neighborhood
or, more generally, what we consider to be close proximity to an RSO for purposes of our
analysis. In our conceptual framework, the features of a particular location play an important role in understanding criminal behavior and identifying where potential victims may
be at the greatest risk. Capturing the location idea best in the sex offender policy context,
neighborhoods represent the at-risk or danger zone in which potential offenders and
potential victims both live. Sex offender notiﬁcation regimes seek to operate at the true
neighborhood level by distributing identifying information about RSOs to those who live
within close proximity and with whom they may interact.
Although any deﬁnition will be somewhat arbitrary, to safeguard against the possibility that any particular approach to deﬁning a neighborhood may explain our ﬁndings, we
experiment with a range of alternatives. In our main analysis, we employ two neighborhood

30

In other words, an IRR above 1 on the interaction does not indicate that an additional RSO results in higher than
average risk post-notiﬁcation; rather, in the case of an IRR of 0.90 on β1, the risk associated with one additional RSO
would remain below average so long as the IRR on β1 is less than approximately 1.11 (or (exp(β4 ))−1 ). See our Online
Appendix for more details.
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deﬁnitions: (1) Baltimore County’s Census block groups (of which there were 498 in 2000)
and (2) circles with one-mile radii drawn around 500 random addresses.31
First, we characterize a crime as proximate to an RSO by whether it occurs within the
same Census block group (CBG) as the offender lives. Using a Census deﬁnition of a
neighborhood translates to our asking whether victimization risk is higher or lower in CBGs
where more sex offenders reside than we might otherwise expect. A CBG, however, is at
least partly an arbitrary deﬁnition of a neighborhood. Although it is a contiguous geographic unit deﬁned by the U.S. Census Bureau, it is designed primarily to contain a certain
number of residents, and it seems unlikely that individuals living in Baltimore County
would consider their CBG a fully accurate representation of their neighborhoods (or,
alternatively, their at-risk zones). In particular, a CBG deﬁnition may not count a sex
offense just a block away from an RSO as a proximate crime (e.g., if the RSO lives near a
border) but may count one that is four blocks away in another direction.
Second, to ensure that CBG arbitrariness does not account for our ﬁndings, we
adopt an alternative approach to deﬁning a potential victim’s neighborhood: for 500
random residential addresses in Baltimore County (the approximate number of CBGs in
our analysis), we simply draw a circle (keeping the address at the center) and deﬁne the
area of that circle as the neighborhood of that address. We then count the number of
registered offenders and crime incidents within that radius for each month and repeat
the CBG-based analysis by estimating Equations (1) and (2) using these circles. Of necessity, this technique assumes a ﬁxed neighborhood shape (circle) and draws lines by
employing a distance (radius) at which near sex offenders (supposedly posing a realistic
threat) are distinguished from those offenders who are considered far away (and therefore thought to pose little threat). Circle neighborhoods may thus be arbitrary, but they
are also convenient and maximally compact. More importantly, circle neighborhoods
differ signiﬁcantly from CBG-deﬁned neighborhoods, allowing us to test the robustness of
our CBG approach.
Justifying any particular radius for a circular neighborhood as appropriate, however,
is more challenging. Fortunately, with respect to both shape (circle) and distance (radius),
we are able to defer to the judgment of Maryland’s Department of Public Safety and
Correctional Services, which manages Maryland’s online sex offender registry. Maryland’s
registry software identiﬁes and maps registered offenders who live within a certain radius of
the address entered, but limits the distance options it makes available to users, allowing
them to search for offenders who live within one-quarter mile, one-half mile, one mile,
three miles, or ﬁve miles of a given address.32 Because Maryland takes these radii as usefully
deﬁning neighborhoods—at least for purposes of reducing sex crime through its sex

31

Figure 1 shows Baltimore County’s CBG neighborhoods. Figure 5 shows Baltimore County’s one-mile circular
neighborhoods. We consider other neighborhood deﬁnitions below.

32

To illustrate, Figure 6 shows the results (from a January 2014 Internet registry query) of searching for RSOs within
a one-half-mile radius of an arbitrary address in Maryland. The inner circle represents one-quarter mile and the outer
circle one-half mile. The ﬂag is the entered address (the “home address” of the individual who is searching); the other
pins represent the locations of RSOs.
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offender notiﬁcation policy—we employ these same distances. We report results for onemile radius neighborhoods, but results produced using the other radii Maryland’s website
suggests are available from the authors upon request.

V. Results
Table 2, which explores the association between the number of registered sex offenders
and the number of crimes within Census block groups, presents results from estimating
Equation (1) for different crime types.33 Overall, our analysis indicates that the existence of
more registered sex offenders living in a particular Census block group is associated with
fewer reported sex offenses. According to Column (1), each additional sex offender is
associated with 7.5 percent fewer sex offenses (0.925 times as much crime). To explore this
relationship further, in Columns (2) through (6), we subdivide all sex offenses into
different (sometimes overlapping) subcategories: (2) forcible rape, (3) all nonrape sex
offenses, (4) sex offenses against adults (excluding rape), (5) sex offenses against children,
and (6) peeping, pornography, and prostitution (PPP) offenses. Although not all results
are statistically signiﬁcant, they show a clear pattern: an additional RSO resident is associated with fewer reported sex offenses of all types.34 We note that the estimated IRRs on the
squared terms are very close to 1, providing no evidence in favor of a nonlinear relationship
between the number of RSOs and sex crime in a neighborhood.35
Table 3 presents the results of estimating Equation (2), which explores how the
relationship between the number of RSOs and victimization risk differs before and after the
implementation of Internet notiﬁcation in Maryland. The IRR estimate on RSOlt represents
the association between an additional RSO and crime before notiﬁcation (when only a
registry was in place) and the exponentiated interaction coefﬁcient on RSOlt*Internett indicates how this relationship changes after notiﬁcation.
Although most of our coefﬁcients are imprecisely estimated, we ﬁnd that before the
implementation of Internet notiﬁcation, one additional neighborhood RSO was associated
with fewer overall reported sex offenses, driven by fewer nonrape sex offenses, especially sex

33

Because we employ CBG ﬁxed effects in our Poisson regressions, any CBG that does not experience a single incident
of the type of crime counted on the left-hand side in any month is effectively dropped, causing the number of
observations included in each column in our tables to differ (because each column represents a different dependent
count variable). We also ran our regressions on a balanced panel that included the same number of observations for
all crime types (i.e., on only those CBGs that had at least one incident of every crime type we examine in Table 2) and
found few differences in our results. These results are available upon request.

34

Note that our regressions include Census block group ﬁxed effects, and so our results are calculated using variation
in the number of RSOs within a block group over time. The fact that RSOs might congregate in particular types of
neighborhoods cannot account for our ﬁndings, unless these neighborhoods changed in important ways during our
sample period and these changes correlated with the number of RSOs, a possibility we address by including our school
enrollment and free and reduced-price lunch controls.

35
If we were to take the point estimate of the coefﬁcient on RSOlt2 as true, then Column (1) would imply that a
neighborhood with one additional RSO resident will have fewer crimes, but also that as the number of resident RSOs
rises, this difference will weaken just slightly on average (compare exp(β1) of 0.925 to exp(β1) × exp(β2) of 0.928).

45,030

34,105

44,460

0.921**
(0.034)
1.002
(0.004)
1.014**
(0.006)
0.997
(0.012)
✓
✓
✓

(3)
Nonrape
Sexual
Offenses

40,850

0.947
(0.044)
1.002
(0.006)
1.012*
(0.007)
0.998
(0.014)
✓
✓
✓

(4)
Sexual
Offenses
(Adult)

34,865

0.957
(0.062)
0.995
(0.008)
1.024*
(0.013)
0.989
(0.021)
✓
✓
✓

(5)
Sexual
Offenses
(Children)

18,620

0.755**
(0.096)
1.013
(0.015)
1.007
(0.015)
1.000
(0.023)
✓
✓
✓

(6)
Peeping,
Pornography,
Prostitution

47,120

1.011
(0.015)
0.997
(0.002)
1.003
(0.002)
0.998
(0.003)
✓
✓
✓

(7)
(Other)
Violent
Offenses

47,310

1.001
(0.012)
1.000
(0.002)
1.004**
(0.002)
1.000
(0.003)
✓
✓
✓

Nonviolent
Offenses

(8)

Notes: The dependent variable for each regression is the number of crimes listed in the column heading in a Census block group neighborhood in a particular month.
Incidence rate ratios from conditional ﬁxed-effect Poisson regressions are reported. School Enrollment is the number of children enrolled in pre-K through ﬁfth grade in
the neighborhood (but not necessarily residing in the neighborhood) divided by the total population residing in the neighborhood. % Eligible Free/Reduced-Price Lunch
is the percentage of enrolled students in the neighborhood who are eligible for free or reduced-price lunches at school. All columns include neighborhood, year, and
month-of-year ﬁxed effects. Robust (sandwich) standard errors are presented in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.

Observations

Block Group Fixed Effects
Year Fixed Effects
Month-of-Year Fixed Effects

School Enrollment

% Eligible Free/Reduced-Price Lunch

Number of RSOs Squared

0.935
(0.058)
1.005
(0.007)
0.981*
(0.011)
0.990
(0.017)
✓
✓
✓

Forcible
Rape

All Sexual
Offenses

0.925**
(0.029)
1.003
(0.004)
1.006
(0.006)
0.996
(0.011)
✓
✓
✓

(2)

(1)

Relationship Between the Number of RSOs and Neighborhood Victimization Risk (Census Block Group Neighborhoods)

Number of RSOs
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45,030

34,105

44,460

0.834*
(0.082)
1.041*
(0.023)
0.959
(0.113)
1.104
(0.112)
0.962*
(0.022)
1.014**
(0.006)
0.998
(0.012)
✓
✓
✓

(3)
Nonrape
Sexual
Offenses

40,850

0.823
(0.118)
1.037
(0.038)
1.010
(0.177)
1.159
(0.175)
0.966
(0.037)
1.012*
(0.007)
0.999
(0.014)
✓
✓
✓

(4)
Sexual
Offenses
(Adult)

34,865

1.019
(0.151)
1.009
(0.031)
1.070
(0.230)
0.917
(0.142)
0.990
(0.031)
1.023*
(0.013)
0.989
(0.021)
✓
✓
✓

(5)
Sexual
Offenses
(Children)

18,620

0.525**
(0.137)
1.116*
(0.069)
0.654*
(0.165)
1.457
(0.356)
0.905
(0.055)
1.007
(0.015)
1.001
(0.022)
✓
✓
✓

(6)
Peeping,
Pornography,
Prostitution

47,120

1.019
(0.042)
0.998
(0.012)
1.050
(0.043)
0.990
(0.039)
0.999
(0.012)
1.003
(0.002)
0.998
(0.003)
✓
✓
✓

(7)
(Other)
Violent
Offenses

47,310

1.019
(0.028)
0.993
(0.008)
0.901***
(0.024)
0.984
(0.029)
1.007
(0.008)
1.004**
(0.002)
1.000
(0.003)
✓
✓
✓

Nonviolent
Offenses

(8)

Notes: The dependent variable for each regression is the number of crimes listed in the column heading in a Census block group neighborhood in a particular month.
Incidence rate ratios from conditional ﬁxed-effect Poisson regressions are reported. School Enrollment is the number of children enrolled in pre-K through ﬁfth grade in
the neighborhood (but not necessarily residing in the neighborhood) divided by the total population residing in the neighborhood. % Eligible Free/Reduced-Price Lunch
is the percentage of enrolled students in the neighborhood who are eligible for free or reduced-price lunches at school. All columns include neighborhood, year, and
month-of-year ﬁxed effects. Robust (sandwich) standard errors are presented in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.

Observations

Block Group Fixed Effects
Year Fixed Effects
Month-of-Year Fixed Effects

School Enrollment

% Eligible Free/Reduced-Price Lunch

RSOs Squared × Notiﬁcation

RSOs × Notiﬁcation

Notiﬁcation (Internet)

Number of RSOs Squared

1.115
(0.190)
0.969
(0.047)
1.151
(0.232)
0.827
(0.139)
1.040
(0.049)
0.980*
(0.011)
0.989
(0.017)
✓
✓
✓

Forcible
Rape

All Sexual
Offenses

0.897
(0.076)
1.024
(0.019)
1.012
(0.102)
1.026
(0.091)
0.980
(0.018)
1.006
(0.006)
0.996
(0.011)
✓
✓
✓

(2)

(1)

Relationship Between the Number of RSOs and Neighborhood Victimization Risk (Census Block Group Neighborhoods)

Number of RSOs

Table 3:
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offenses against adults and PPP crimes. These negative associations are slightly larger than
those reported in Table 2: each additional neighborhood RSO is associated with approximately 10.3 percent fewer total sex offenses.36 Importantly, forcible rape and, possibly, sex
offenses against children do not follow this pattern. Under registration, our (admittedly
imprecise) point estimates suggest that an additional RSO in a neighborhood increases the
frequency of forcible rape by 11.5 percent.
How do these relationships change under an Internet notiﬁcation regime? With
respect to all sex offenses, an additional RSO post-notiﬁcation is associated with an IRR that
is 1.026 times the pre-Internet IRR.37 In other words, an additional neighborhood RSO
post-notiﬁcation is still associated with fewer reported sex offenses, but the difference is now
smaller than prior to notiﬁcation (0.897 vs. 1.026 × 0.897 = 0.920), implying the law may
have resulted in a slight increase in the overall relative risk of being victimized in RSO
neighborhoods. Nevertheless, our point estimates still indicate that RSO-heavy neighborhoods are safer on the whole post-notiﬁcation relative to other neighborhoods. Importantly, forcible rape and sex offenses against children show a clearly different pattern. Just
as victimization risk for these crimes under registration seemed to increase with the addition of an RSO to a neighborhood, notiﬁcation appears to reduce victimization risk.
Our ﬁndings may be consistent with alternative explanations if, during our sample
period, RSOs tended to move into neighborhoods where crime was generally changing
relative to other neighborhoods.38 We evaluate this possibility by re-running our Equations
(1) and (2) for other violent and nonviolent crimes. If RSOs happen to congregate in
places where crime is declining, for example, we would also expect a correlation between
the number of RSOs in a neighborhood and other measures of crime. Our results offer no
support for this possibility. We ﬁnd that the number of RSOs in a CBG has very little
association with the number of other (nonsexual) violent crimes or nonviolent crimes (see
Tables 2 and 3, Columns (7) and (8)). We also estimated regressions identical to those in
Columns (1) through (6), but with measures of violent and nonviolent crime included as
controls to account for any confounding crime or criminal justice trends. Our results were
unchanged, although, of course, we cannot rule out the possibility of some other omitted
variable.
In Table 4, we present our results from estimating Equation (2) using circular neighborhoods with radii of one mile centered on 500 random addresses in Baltimore County.39

36

In Table 3, we also now detect some evidence of a nonlinear relationship between the number of RSOs and
reported sex crime (especially with respect to nonrape sex offenses) in the pre-notiﬁcation period. Excepting forcible
rape, our estimates of β2 suggest that crime does not decline as quickly with the addition of an RSO if RSOs are more
common.
37

These relationships (across crimes) are estimated imprecisely, despite being large in magnitude.

38

Our neighborhood ﬁxed effects control for the fact that RSOs may generally live in atypical neighborhoods and move
between them. Only RSOs disproportionally living in and moving to neighborhoods that are becoming safer over time
has the potential to spuriously produce the results we ﬁnd.

39

Our results for the analyses of other radii do not differ in substance and are available upon request.

45,410

0.976**
(0.010)
1.000
(0.000)
0.951
(0.050)
1.012
(0.010)
1.000
(0.000)
1.003
(0.003)
✓
✓
✓
41,135

1.024
(0.019)
0.999
(0.001)
1.692***
(0.174)
0.950***
(0.015)
1.001*
(0.001)
1.009*
(0.006)
✓
✓
✓

Forcible
Rape

All Sexual
Offenses

45,125

0.960***
(0.012)
1.000
(0.001)
0.793***
(0.047)
1.032***
(0.012)
1.000
(0.001)
1.001
(0.004)
✓
✓
✓

(3)
Nonrape
Sexual
Offenses

43,890

0.917***
(0.017)
1.002**
(0.001)
0.688***
(0.057)
1.087***
(0.018)
0.999**
(0.001)
1.007
(0.005)
✓
✓
✓

(4)
Sexual
Offenses
(Adult)

41,990

1.02
(0.021)
0.997***
(0.001)
1.267**
(0.129)
0.944***
(0.018)
1.004***
(0.001)
1.003
(0.008)
✓
✓
✓

(5)
Sexual
Offenses
(Children)

36,100

1.014
(0.038)
0.998
(0.001)
0.538***
(0.080)
1.015
(0.031)
1.000
(0.001)
0.982
(0.015)
✓
✓
✓

(6)
Peeping,
Pornography,
Prostitution

Notes: The dependent variable for each regression is the number of crimes listed in the column heading in a circular neighborhood (radius of one mile) in a particular
month. Incidence rate ratios from conditional ﬁxed-effect Poisson regressions are reported. % Eligible Free/Reduced-Price Lunch is the percentage of enrolled students
in the neighborhood who are eligible for free or reduced-price lunches at school. All columns include neighborhood, year, and month-of-year ﬁxed effects. Robust
(sandwich) standard errors are presented in parentheses. Standard errors calculated in line with Bertanha and Moser (2014) are reported in the Online Appendix.
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.

Observations

Block Group Fixed Effects
Year Fixed Effects
Month-of-Year Fixed Effects

% Eligible Free/Reduced-Price Lunch

RSOs Squared × Notiﬁcation

RSOs × Notiﬁcation

Notiﬁcation (Internet)

Number of RSOs Squared

Number of RSOs

(2)

(1)

Table 4: Relationship Between the Number of RSOs and Neighborhood Victimization Risk
(Circular Neighborhoods—One-Mile Radius)
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In substance, the patterns in Table 4 line up closely with the numbers reported in Table 3
for all offenses except PPP crimes. There are relatively fewer total sex offense reports within
one mile of a random residential home that has relatively more RSOs within a mile and, as
before, this pattern becomes weaker after public notiﬁcation commences. Forcible rape
and sex offenses against children continue to point in a different direction, however:
victimization risk in RSO neighborhoods is slightly higher (although not statistically signiﬁcantly so), with notiﬁcation appearing to reduce the risk of these crimes. Indeed, in
both Tables 3 and 4, our estimates suggest that notiﬁcation resulted in a net reduction of
risk for rape and sex offenses against children, such that an additional RSO in a neighborhood post-notiﬁcation is associated with a below-average level of victimization risk,
despite public assumptions to the contrary.40
Figure 5 maps these circular neighborhoods using a one-mile radius deﬁnition.
Unlike with our CBG analysis, these neighborhoods overlap with each other. As a result, our
regression error terms may be spatially correlated across neighborhoods—that is, two
neighborhoods that are physically overlapping will clearly be subject to some of the same
random shocks. In our Online Appendix, we carry out the method described in Bertanha
and Moser (2014) (see footnote 28) for testing for and correcting spatially-biased standard
errors. As expected, this analysis reveals signiﬁcant time-variant spatial correlation, but
when we calculate consistent spatial variance estimators, the results are roughly similar.
Therefore, Table 4 records our estimates with regular robust (sandwich) standard errors;
results with spatially corrected standard errors can be found in the Online Appendix.41
In summary, we ﬁnd that sex offense victimization risks are generally lower (across all
offenses) in neighborhoods that have more RSO residents,42 and that reported crime in
RSO neighborhoods appears to increase slightly after the implementation of notiﬁcation.
There is considerable heterogeneity across types of sex offenses, however. With respect to
forcible rape and sex offenses against children (which are a minority of sex crimes in
numbers, but may be more serious in their aggregate consequences), we discern the
opposite pattern. The fact that registration and notiﬁcation have different effects on
different types of sex offenses is not surprising; sex offenses are diverse. Some require
planning or involve money; others are impulse crimes or involve intimidation or violence.

40

In fact, this result helps explain the consistency across sex crime types of the negative relationship between an
additional neighborhood RSO and victimization risk in Table 2. The negative relationship is driven by the implementation of notiﬁcation for forcible rape and sex offenses against children, whereas the negative relationship with
respect to sex offenses against adults (not including rape) and PPP crimes remains in spite of the effects of notiﬁcation
because of the strong negative association of nearby RSOs and these crimes under registration.
41

In addition, these regressions do not include the school enrollment numbers because it is not possible to calculate
the total populations in our circular neighborhoods. Our regressions do include the percent of students who are
eligible for free and reduced-price lunch as an independent variable, and we also include as controls the number of
violent and nonviolent crimes in each neighborhood in each month as well.

42

These results would suggest that sex offenders use “buffer zones” in their crime location decisions if RSOs were the
primary source of reported sex offenses. Unfortunately, as we have noted, they are not—a study using data from New
York State showed that over 90 percent of reported sex offense cases were committed by first-time offenders, and so any
interpretation is more complicated (Sandler et al. 2008).
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Random address circular neighborhoods.

Source: Address Points Shapeﬁle, Baltimore County Geographic Information Systems (GIS).

There is no reason to assume, ex ante, that offender, police, and victim behavior will
respond to how the law addresses these crimes in a way that affects their frequency and
geographic distribution in the same way.
Our framework’s predictions in Section II.B were ambiguous, but they are clearly
consistent with the evidence we see with respect to nonrape adult sex offenses and peeping,
pornography, and prostitution crimes. Registration can lead to low levels of crime in areas
with more RSOs when RSOs are not evenly geographically distributed, and notiﬁcation can
indeed result in an increase in reported crime in RSO neighborhoods either because
NonRSOs become more likely to offend in RSO neighborhoods (perhaps because they are
less likely to be detected in the presence of RSOs) or because RSOs become more likely to
recidivate near their homes as a result of the economic and social costs of being publicly
known as a sex offender.43 Although our data do not allow us to untangle these two

43

See Prescott (2011) for an argument (in the child pornography context) that the identifying information made
available by Internet registry sites might allow potential sex offenders (both NonRSOs and RSOs) to conspire more
easily with RSOs, making them more dangerous.
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Maryland Sex Offender Registry search results (one-half-mile radius, Jan. 2014).

Source: <http://www.dpscs.state.md.us/sorSearch/>.

possibilities, the size of the effects we discern are nontrivial and should be of concern to
policymakers and the public.
Indeed, consistent with the evidence we present here, other scholarship has raised
the possibility that notiﬁcation may be counterproductive, at least with respect to controlling RSO recidivism (Prescott & Rockoff 2011). At the same time, while the possibility exists
that NonRSOs may be deterred from committing sex crimes by sex offender laws that will
be applied to them down the road should they be caught and convicted, no work of which
we are aware has raised the possibility that other dimensions of NonRSO offending
behavior—for example, the decision where to commit a crime—may be inﬂuenced by sex
offender laws like notiﬁcation. At the very least, even if notiﬁcation has moderated the
association somewhat, our ﬁndings support the idea that the forces that encourage sex
offenders as a group to commit crimes away from where RSOs live outweigh any net
beneﬁts—on average—of committing those crimes nearby, where people and policymakers
assume the greatest risk exists.
In our CBG-neighborhood analysis, notiﬁcation’s largest effect on victimization
risk in terms of magnitude is by far with respect to peeping, pornography, and prostitution
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(PPP) offenses. Reports of such crimes appear to have increased dramatically postnotiﬁcation—although neighborhoods with more RSOs nevertheless still have fewer PPP
crimes on average post-notiﬁcation, and the number of PPP offenses is also relatively low,
meaning that changes in the numbers of these crimes is less dramatic than it may seem from
the IRRs we calculate. Recall that we use reported measures of crime, and so any new report
could represent a new incident or an existing incident that is newly reported. In our view,
although the PPP effects are run-of-the-mill in the circular neighborhood analysis (raising
the possibility that the pattern is spurious), either interpretation of the increase is both
plausible and interesting.
To begin with, notiﬁcation may have increased the propensity of RSOs to engage in
vice or peeping tom offenses, especially if the notoriety that followed being publicly
identiﬁed in their neighborhoods led to more RSO unemployment. Likewise, if such crime
became more common in RSO neighborhoods, NonRSOs may have found visiting
these neighborhoods more attractive post-notiﬁcation. Alternatively, notiﬁcation may have
generated more frivolous reports of criminal activity by frightened residents who were
newly informed of the identities of their RSO neighbors. Reports of peeping tom offenses,
in particular, appear to ﬁt this story.44 Finally, if police felt pressure to patrol RSO neighborhoods more intensely or if the public increased its monitoring effort, previously undetected PPP crimes seem more likely to be newly observed than other categories of
undetected sex crimes, which are often more hidden. This seems particularly to be the case
with prostitution, and if the police were regularly engaging with RSOs in their neighborhoods post-notiﬁcation, the discovery of pornography offenses seems possible.
Importantly, our framework can also help us understand the quite different patterns
we observe with respect to forcible rape and child sex offenses. While on average victimization risk of these crimes appears to be lower over our entire sample period in RSO-dense
neighborhoods, the point estimates of the IRR on RSOlt in Equation (2) (Tables 3 and 4)
are positive (although statistically insigniﬁcant), pointing to an increase in average victimization risk with an additional RSO resident before the implementation of notiﬁcation. By
contrast, after notiﬁcation, an additional RSO appears to reduce forcible rape and child sex
offense victimization risk. Whether we use CBG or circular neighborhoods, our ﬁndings
suggest that notiﬁcation reduces the risk of these crimes to below-average levels. In Table 3,
an additional RSO reduces victimization risk for rape by almost 8 percent and for sex
offenses against children by more than 6 percent. In Table 4, the reduction is smaller in
magnitude, but still important in practical terms.
With one caveat (and keeping in mind that our estimates are not precisely estimated), the patterns in the data for forcible rape and child sex offenses appear to be
consistent with public and policymaker perceptions. Absent notiﬁcation, children and
potential rape victims may have been at greater risk in neighborhoods with additional
RSOs, and our results are consistent with notiﬁcation mitigating those risks.
These conjectures accord with research showing that notiﬁed parents take more
protective actions on behalf of their children than do nonnotiﬁed parents (Bandy 2011;
44

At odds with this story is the fact that in our data there are very few peeping tom reports; a majority of the PPP
category is made up of prostitution and pornography crimes.
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Beck et al. 2004), despite the fact that the literature has shown no overall effect of knowledge of RSOs on risk-mitigating behavior (Anderson & Sample 2008; Bandy 2011; Caputo
& Brodsky 2004; Phillips 1998). If true, victim precaution taking (i.e., adults protecting
their children) near RSO homes may be particularly intense. In our conceptual framework,
such victim activity might well drive NonRSOs and RSOs alike to search for victims elsewhere. On the other hand, most sex crimes committed against children are perpetrated by
people they know, meaning that displacement to other neighborhoods may be less likely to
occur in this context. Other possibilities, then, are that (1) the existence of nearby known
RSOs serves as a deterrent to those NonRSOs who live near RSOs (as local NonRSOs may
pose the greatest threat) and (2) more intense policing in RSO neighborhoods may make
offending even against children who an RSO knows more difﬁcult. These possibilities imply
deterrence rather than displacement.
It is worth noting that our ﬁndings with respect to sex offenses against children seem
inconsistent with a reporting effect story, a conclusion that may inform our other results,
although the discussion above makes plain that drawing inferences about the dynamics of
one sex offense from the dynamics of another can only be done with caution. Before
notiﬁcation, when RSOs were presumably living anonymously, a relatively high number of
sex crimes against children were reported in neighborhoods with more RSOs. Once these
RSOs became publicly known, the likelihood of a reported incident decreased with additional RSOs. Such a story seems at odds with the idea that notiﬁcation may have resulted in
more frivolous reports in RSO neighborhoods or that crime that would have gone undetected prior to notiﬁcation in RSO neighborhoods was instead detected via more intense
public monitoring.
Similarly, the forcible rape numbers dovetail with the buffer zone literature’s claim
that serial rapists are particularly concerned about being recognized during the commission of a crime against a stranger (Duwe et al. 2008), even when the potential adult rape
victims in an RSO’s neighborhood take no effective precautions. Additionally, to the extent
that adult rapes are more likely to occur in places more easily monitored, and because
notiﬁcation may have led to increased monitoring by the public and the police, RSOs and
NonRSOs alike may have gravitated toward committing rape away from where RSOs live
post-notiﬁcation.
The caveat to the idea that these results align generally with the public’s assumptions
about the desirability and likely consequences of notiﬁcation, of course, is that our data also
suggest that, under notiﬁcation, a neighborhood with an additional RSO may actually be
safer for children and potential rape victims than otherwise comparable neighborhoods
with fewer RSOs. As we explained at the beginning of Section II, the idea that you might
actually be safer living near an RSO of whom you have been made aware is at stark odds with
conventional wisdom (and housing price dynamics).
On the whole, our ﬁndings supply evidence in support of two dynamics that push in
opposite directions. Overall, and with respect to sex offenses against adults and PPP crimes,
the forces that encourage sex offenders to commit crimes away from where RSOs live
outweigh any net beneﬁts—on average—of committing those crimes where people and
policymakers assume the greatest risk exists. Yet revealing where RSOs live appears to have
made relatively safe RSO neighborhoods somewhat less safe with respect to these crimes,
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perhaps because (1) NonRSOs may prefer, post-notiﬁcation, to attack where RSOs live,
assuming victim precaution is focused elsewhere, or (2) RSOs may have become more likely
to reoffend in general, and as a result of the normal dynamics that underlie distance decay
(perhaps strengthened by notiﬁcation resulting in more unemployment and social isolation), they tend to do so more closely to their homes. By contrast, for forcible rape and
crimes involving children, under registration, distance decay seems paramount, but under
notiﬁcation, the geographic patterns in the data suggest that deterrence or displacement of
crime to another neighborhood better characterize reality.
Our goal is to describe the relationship between where RSOs live and where sex
offenses are most likely to occur because the public and policymakers make strong assumptions about this relationship, assuming that proximity is tantamount to risk. We ﬁnd a much
more complicated story, but even if we are unable to draw broad behavioral conclusions on
the basis of our evidence, the reduced-form effects are clear: even under notiﬁcation,
victimization risk appears to be lower (or at least not higher) for all sex offenses in those
neighborhoods where RSOs live.

VI. Extensions and Robustness Checks
In this section of the article, we further probe our empirical work, addressing particular
concerns and ensuring the overall robustness of the patterns we observe in the data. In
order, we consider in more depth (1) the possibility that victimization risk has a nonlinear
relationship with the number of RSOs living in a neighborhood, (2) the possibility that our
results may not account for potential spillovers between neighborhoods that are adjacent to
each other, (3) the effects of employing two other (less attractive, in our view) deﬁnitions
of neighborhoods, and (4) whether an alternative approach to evaluating the effects of
notiﬁcation on the relative frequency of sex crime—comparing the victimization risk levels
near random addresses to the risk levels near RSO addresses—may provide further insight
into our ﬁndings.
A. Nonlinear Effects
In general, our inclusion of the squared number of RSOs (RSOlt2 ) in Equations (1) and (2)
produced somewhat inconsistent evidence on whether a nonlinear relationship exists
between the number of nearby RSOs and relative victimization risk. Table 3’s CBG neighborhood results suggest, in particular for peeping, pornography, and prostitution offenses,
that the difference in risk associated with an additional RSO (whether pre- or postnotiﬁcation) tends to weaken the main effect—that is, victimization risk is a monotonically
decreasing (or increasing) function of the number of RSOs, but the incremental effect is
smaller as the number of neighborhood RSOs increases. By contrast, our circular neighborhood results (Table 4) provide no conﬁrmatory evidence of these nonlinear relationships.
To explore this issue further and check for additional or different types of nonlinearity, we use simple nonparametric methods to test for threshold effects. Speciﬁcally, we
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reestimate Equation (2) using our CBG neighborhoods, but we replace RSOlt and RSOlt2
with three indicator variables to capture separately the effects of moving from zero to at
most one RSO in a month, moving from zero to at most three RSOs, and moving from zero
to any number more than three RSOs.45 The results of this exercise, reported in Table 5,
provide much useful information about the relationship between RSO concentration and
levels of victimization risk.
First, our estimates imply that the risk-reducing effect of additional RSOs (prenotiﬁcation) disappears (per RSO) as the number of RSOs in a neighborhood increases. In
other words, the reduction in risk in a neighborhood from moving from zero to between
one and three RSOs is close to zero and may even be slightly positive.46 The results for rape
and child sex offenses differ, however. With respect to forcible rape, additional RSOs
(pre-notiﬁcation) result in fewer rapes, suggesting an important nonlinearity as well as a
commonality with adult sex offenses and PPP crimes—at more than three RSOs, a
neighborhood’s rape victimization risk under registration is below average. One explanation for this threshold effect is that more than one RSO results in disproportionately more
police monitoring. Incongruously, with respect to sex offenses against children, additional
RSOs are associated with larger incremental increases in risk.
Second, and unexpectedly, the effect of notiﬁcation laws on victimization risk is
nonmonotonic: notiﬁcation appears to increase relative victimization risk for many categories of sex offenses when there is just one RSO in a neighborhood, but decrease the
likelihood of a reported sex crime when there are many RSOs in a neighborhood. Speciﬁcally, with fewer than three RSOs in a neighborhood (a large majority of the neighborhoods
in our data), the interaction IRRs are above 1 (not including forcible rape or child sex
offenses), meaning that, as in Table 3, additional RSOs are associated with fewer—but not
as many fewer—sex offenses.47 Once a neighborhood has more than three RSOs, however,
our point estimates indicate that notiﬁcation reduces crime. Speciﬁcally, prior to notiﬁcation, an average of 6.3 percent fewer sex crimes were reported in neighborhoods with more
than three RSOs (relative to neighborhoods with zero RSOs), but post-notiﬁcation, this
average difference increases to more than 25 percent. This dynamic is true across the
categories of sex offenses we consider (even child sex offenses), strongly suggesting that
RSO concentration matters for the geography of victimization.

45

Recall that, as we explain at the end of Section III, because an RSO may live in a neighborhood for only a fraction
of a month, the RSO count in a particular neighborhood in a given month need not be a whole number.

46

Our point estimates further suggest that victimization risk is lower in neighborhoods with between one and three
RSOs than it is in neighborhoods with more than three RSOs, although the difference may be due to random
sampling variation.

47

With respect to all sex offenses, up to one RSO pre-notiﬁcation was associated with an 11.1 percent reduction in
victimization risk relative to neighborhoods with zero RSOs. Post-notiﬁcation, this average reduction declined to 9.2
percent. Similarly, neighborhoods with between one and three sex offenders have 9 percent fewer sex offenses
pre-notiﬁcation, but post-notiﬁcation, that number dropped to roughly 8 percent. This signiﬁes that moving from one
RSO to two RSOs post-notiﬁcation affects victimization risk very little.

45,030

0.899
(0.088)
0.902
(0.104)
0.937
(0.168)
0.993
(0.103)
1.022
(0.113)
1.012
(0.123)
0.773
(0.140)
1.006
(0.006)
0.996
(0.011)
✓
✓
✓
34,105

1.019
(0.188)
0.972
(0.237)
0.734
(0.292)
1.067
(0.213)
0.922
(0.194)
1.049
(0.255)
0.921
(0.387)
0.981*
(0.011)
0.990
(0.017)
✓
✓
✓

Forcible
Rape

All Sexual
Offenses

44,460

0.857
(0.098)
0.866
(0.112)
1.000
(0.199)
0.956
(0.117)
1.061
(0.135)
1.015
(0.145)
0.733
(0.146)
1.013**
(0.007)
0.998
(0.013)
✓
✓
✓

(3)
Nonrape
Sexual
Offenses

40,850

0.826
(0.126)
0.813
(0.145)
0.884
(0.314)
0.966
(0.173)
1.238
(0.202)
1.227
(0.239)
0.953
(0.340)
1.012*
(0.007)
0.999
(0.015)
✓
✓
✓

(4)
Sexual
Offenses
(Adult)

34,865

1.103
(0.214)
1.149
(0.235)
1.391
(0.544)
1.104
(0.251)
0.841
(0.176)
0.753
(0.165)
0.519*
(0.202)
1.022*
(0.013)
0.989
(0.020)
✓
✓
✓

(5)
Sexual
Offenses
(Children)

18,620

0.517**
(0.163)
0.510*
(0.181)
0.469
(0.355)
0.727
(0.183)
1.071
(0.399)
1.057
(0.381)
0.881
(0.642)
1.001
(0.014)
1.003
(0.022)
✓
✓
✓

(6)
Peeping,
Pornography,
Prostitution

Notes: The dependent variable for each regression is the number of crimes listed in the column heading in a Census block group neighborhood in a particular month.
Incidence rate ratios from conditional ﬁxed-effect Poisson regressions are reported. School Enrollment is the number of children enrolled in pre-K through ﬁfth grade in
the neighborhood (but not necessarily residing in the neighborhood) divided by the total population residing in the neighborhood. % Eligible Free/Reduced-Price Lunch
is the percentage of enrolled students in the neighborhood who are eligible for free or reduced-price lunches at school. All columns include neighborhood, year, and
month-of-year ﬁxed effects. Robust (sandwich) standard errors are presented in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.

Observations

Block Group Fixed Effects
Year Fixed Effects
Month-of-Year Fixed Effects

School Enrollment

% Eligible Free/Reduced-Price Lunch

1(RSO > 3) × Notiﬁcation

1(1 < RSO ≤ 3) × Notiﬁcation

1(0 < RSO ≤ 1) × Notiﬁcation

Notiﬁcation (Internet)

1(RSO > 3)

1(1 < RSO ≤ 3)

1(0 < RSO ≤ 1)

(2)

(1)

Table 5: Relationship Between the Number of RSOs and Neighborhood Victimization Risk (Census Block Group Neighborhoods—
Alternative Nonlinearity Speciﬁcation)
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B. Spillovers
Thus far we have focused on the association between criminals and crime in the same
neighborhood. However, our conceptual framework—as well as more well-known ways of
thinking about sex offender behavior (e.g., buffer zones)—implies that a sex offender may
deliberately seek out victims who are far away from his home to avoid detection and,
possibly, victim precautionary behavior. If RSOs and NonRSOs are not randomly distributed, our estimates may understate or overstate the true relationship between local RSOs
and relative victimization risk. Accordingly, accounting for RSOs in adjacent neighborhoods may shed important light on the geography of victimization.
To explore this possibility, we add to Equation (2) the average number of RSOs in
neighboring (contiguous) Census block groups, as well as its interaction with an indicator
for whether Internet notiﬁcation was in place. We chose the average rather than the total
number of adjacent RSOs because a CBG that just happens to touch many neighboring
CBGs may have an artiﬁcially inﬂated (i.e., unrepresentative) total as compared to a CBG
that is surrounded by fewer neighboring CBGs.
Table 6 presents our results. In general, the main effect of additional adjacent RSOs
is uniform (in sign and magnitude) across all categories of sex offenses—that is, conditional
on the number of own-neighborhood RSOs, an additional adjacent RSO is associated with
an overall 2.6 percent decrease in reported sex offenses in the period before Internet
notiﬁcation became available. With respect to the effects of notiﬁcation on the relationship
between RSO residency and victimization risk, the IRR on the relevant interaction terms
being less than 1 evinces a similar weakening of the pre-Internet effect just as with ownneighborhood RSOs. In fact, for all sex offenses, notiﬁcation is associated with the attrition
of the reduced risk associated with adjacent RSOs. Moreover, accounting for adjacent RSOs
post-notiﬁcation reduces the magnitude of the IRRs on RSOlt*Internett, with the IRRs on all
sex offenses dropping below 1 and lowering others that were above 1.
This pattern is suggestive of geographic displacement. The more RSOs there are in
nearby neighborhoods post-notiﬁcation, the higher the victimization risk, all else equal—
even with respect to forcible rape and sex offenses against children. In the case of all sex
offenses, the point estimates imply that notiﬁcation reduces the threat of local RSOs, but
increases by an almost equal amount the risk posed by adjacent neighborhood RSOs,
revealing that some of the measured effect of notiﬁcation in neighborhoods with RSOs in
Tables 3, 4, and 5 may have been attributable to RSOs in adjacent neighborhoods.
Although merely suggestive, these patterns may also help explain existing research that
claims to ﬁnd little overall association between registration or notiﬁcation laws and
decreases in overall sex offense rates: these laws may simply displace rather than reduce
crime. Unfortunately, our data and methods do not allow us to explore the full geography
of sex offense displacement in this article.
C. Additional Neighborhood Definitions
In studying the relationship between RSO residency and sex offense victimization risk, we
primarily rely on two deﬁnitions of neighborhoods. First, we use a nonoverlapping Census
deﬁnition, equating to 498 neighborhoods of roughly similar population size. Second, we

45,030

0.919
(0.081)
1.022
(0.018)
0.974
(0.016)
0.917
(0.098)
0.997
(0.092)
0.983
(0.018)
1.026*
(0.014)
1.005
(0.006)
0.996
(0.011)
✓
✓
✓
34,105

1.120
(0.196)
0.969
(0.047)
0.991
(0.034)
1.122
(0.255)
0.824
(0.144)
1.040
(0.049)
1.006
(0.031)
0.980*
(0.011)
0.989
(0.017)
✓
✓
✓

Forcible
Rape

All Sexual
Offenses

44,460

0.861
(0.086)
1.039*
(0.022)
0.967*
(0.018)
0.851
(0.109)
1.062
(0.110)
0.965
(0.021)
1.033**
(0.016)
1.013**
(0.006)
0.998
(0.012)
✓
✓
✓

(3)
Nonrape
Sexual
Offenses

40,850

0.859
(0.124)
1.033
(0.037)
0.960
(0.024)
0.862
(0.160)
1.101
(0.168)
0.969
(0.036)
1.044**
(0.022)
1.011*
(0.007)
0.998
(0.014)
✓
✓
✓

(4)
Sexual
Offenses
(Adult)

34,865

1.037
(0.158)
1.008
(0.031)
0.971
(0.029)
0.981
(0.236)
0.901
(0.143)
0.991
(0.032)
1.022
(0.027)
1.023*
(0.013)
0.989
(0.021)
✓
✓
✓

(5)
Sexual
Offenses
(Children)

18,620

0.509**
(0.134)
1.127**
(0.066)
0.974
(0.037)
0.622*
(0.169)
1.515*
(0.355)
0.896*
(0.051)
1.008
(0.032)
1.008
(0.015)
1.000
(0.023)
✓
✓
✓

(6)
Peeping,
Pornography,
Prostitution

Notes: The dependent variable for each regression is the number of crimes listed in the column heading in a Census block group neighborhood in a particular month.
Incidence rate ratios from conditional ﬁxed-effect Poisson regressions are reported. School Enrollment is the number of children enrolled in pre-K through ﬁfth grade in
the neighborhood (but not necessarily residing in the neighborhood) divided by the total population residing in the neighborhood. % Eligible Free/Reduced-Price Lunch
is the percentage of enrolled students in the neighborhood who are eligible for free or reduced-price lunches at school. All columns include neighborhood, year, and
month-of-year ﬁxed effects. Robust (sandwich) standard errors are presented in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.

Observations

Block Group Fixed Effects
Year Fixed Effects
Month-of-Year Fixed Effects

School Enrollment

% Eligible Free/Reduced-Price Lunch

Avg. Adjacent RSOs × Notiﬁcation

RSOs Squared × Notiﬁcation

RSOs × Notiﬁcation

Notiﬁcation (Internet)

Avg. Adjacent RSOs

Number of RSOs Squared

Number of RSOs

(2)

(1)

Table 6: Relationship Between the Number of RSOs and Neighborhood Victimization Risk (Census Block Group Neighborhoods—
Spillover Correction)
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Figure 7: Baltimore County voting districts.

Source: 2010 TIGER/Line Shapeﬁles—Voting Districts.

use the distances Maryland considers relevant to victimization risk, creating circular neighborhoods using 500 random address points in Baltimore County and presenting results for
neighborhoods with a one-mile radius. For robustness, we also analyze the relationship of
neighborhood RSO residency to sex offense victimization risk using two other
nonoverlapping deﬁnitions of neighborhoods: voting districts (of which there are 223 in
Baltimore County) and zip codes (of which there are 55). The number of voting districts
(see Figure 7) is less than half the number of CBGs, and zip code neighborhoods are quite
large (see Figure 8), numbering only slightly more than 10 percent of the number of CBG
neighborhoods. With respect to voting districts, the pattern of coefﬁcients we estimate is
remarkably consistent with our results in Tables 2, 3, and 4.48 Our zip code analysis, on the
other hand, shows little relationship between the number of RSOs and victimization risk.
Given how large these neighborhoods are, however, this result is not particularly surprising.

48

Results are available from the authors upon request.
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Figure 8:
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Baltimore County zip codes.

Source: 2010 TIGER/Line Shapeﬁles—ﬁve-digit ZIP Code Tabulation Areas (ZCTAs).

D. Risk Comparison of Random Versus RSO Neighborhoods
Another strategy to examine whether notiﬁcation may alter the relationship between where
RSOs live and where sex crime occurs is to compare notiﬁcation’s apparent effects on crime
in neighborhoods around RSO addresses to analogous changes in neighborhoods around
random residential addresses. We attempt this approach ﬁrst by creating neighborhoods of
various sizes around each RSO and then comparing how sex crime victimization risk in
those neighborhoods changes around the time of notiﬁcation to any similarly timed change
in crime levels in neighborhoods of similar sizes built around random addresses. One
advantage of this ﬂexible approach is that it allows us to experiment with many different
sizes of neighborhoods, the results of which turn out to offer at least some insight into what
may be the most appropriate neighborhood size from a policy perspective when the goal is
to minimize victimization risk in a particular location.
To carry out this exercise, we geocode the same 500 randomly chosen residential
addresses as we did in our circular neighborhood analysis, and then measure how many
incidents of each crime type occur (in each month) near these random homes. Separately,
we count how many similar incidents occur near RSO addresses. We then compare
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these two measures. We can make this comparison at any distance. In what follows, we
examine this relationship at distances starting at 0.1 miles away from the residence in
question and at each 0.1 mile increment further away from the home, up to a total distance
of 3 miles.49
To evaluate the potential consequences of Internet notiﬁcation, we ask whether there
is a change in the fraction of total crimes that are type i near an RSO’s home and compare
that to any change in the fraction of total crimes that are type i near an average random
residential address. Speciﬁcally, for each crime type i we calculate:

Yilta

∑i =1Yilta
k

.

In the context of sex offenses, this fraction would measure the percentage of all crimes
attributable to sex offenses within an l mile radius of address a at time t. We then use these
fractions as dependent variables in a simple OLS regression:

Yilta

∑i =1Yilta
k

= β0 + β1RSOAddress Ita + β2Internett + β3 RSOAddress Ita × Internett + εilta ,

(3)

where RSOAddresslta is an indicator for whether address a is an RSO’s home (as opposed
to a random residential address). Our coefﬁcient of interest, β3, captures any change
after notiﬁcation in the fraction of crimes that are type i for neighborhoods centered
around RSO addresses relative to any such change in the same fraction for neighborhoods centered around random residential addresses. Figure 9 plots our estimates
of β3 from Equation (3) for radii from 0.1 to 3 miles from the house (by
0.1 mile increments) for the fraction of various sex offenses (all sex offenses, forcible rape, nonrape sex offenses, sex offenses against adults, sex offenses against children,
and peeping, pornography, and prostitution offenses) relative to all reported crimes
(i.e., the number of the relevant category of sex offense divided by the number of all
crimes).
The patterns are consistent with our earlier analysis but they also offer additional
information on the role neighborhood size plays in understanding the geography of
sex offense victimization.50 First, as expected, the β3s for sex offenses against children and
forcible rape are, for the most part, below zero (suggesting that notiﬁcation reduced
victimization risk) and the β3s for sex offenses against adults are above zero (suggesting
the opposite), with the β3s for all sex offenses regularly crossing back and forth from
positive to negative territory. Second, although the ﬁgure is very noisy, it is possible to
discern a general arc as the radius of the neighborhood grows. The effect that notiﬁcation

49

These areas do not overlap and each comparison covers a unique geographic area. That is, we make our comparisons at a distance from 0 to 0.1 miles, then from 0.1 to 0.2 miles, etc.

50

For purposes of comparison, if we were to construct a circular neighborhood that contained the same area as the
average Census block group, that radius would be approximately 0.66 miles.
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Relative crime risk analysis.

Post-Notification Change in % of Total Crime
–.004
–.002
0
.002
.004

Figure 9:

0

.5

1

1.5
Radius (miles)

All Sex Offenses
Nonrape Sex Offenses
Sex Offenses - Child

2

2.5

3

Rape
Sex Offenses - Adult
PPP Offenses

Notes: Each symbol represents a β3 estimated in Equation (3) in the text. The regressions are performed for every 0.1 mile
band around the RSO and random addresses from 0 to 3 miles.

has on victimization risk seems to be most beneﬁcial at around 0.5 miles and least beneﬁcial at about 1 mile. Not surprisingly, the lines begin to run closer together as the
radius approaches 3 miles. One can interpret this ﬁgure as generally suggesting that
choosing the size of the neighborhood (or the scope of notiﬁcation, assuming that
neighborhoods cannot easily be resized) is as important as deciding whether to employ
notiﬁcation in the ﬁrst place. Another possibility raised by these patterns is that notiﬁcation
may be more advantageous (and thus also more harmful) in certain geographies than in
others.

VII. Conclusions
In this article, we explore the interaction of sex offender laws and the geography of
victimization. We focus on two questions. First, as policymakers and the public assume, is
someone more likely to report being victimized, all else equal, in a neighborhood in which
relatively more RSOs (or registered sex offenders) live? Second, whatever the relationship
between RSO residency and reported neighborhood sex offense risk, does this relationship
change in response to implementing a notiﬁcation regime in which the public is informed
of RSO identity and address information via the Internet?
Using data from Baltimore County, we ﬁnd evidence that, in general, a neighborhood
with an additional RSO is counterintuitively safer than (not just as safe as, but actually safer
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than) an otherwise comparable neighborhood. Yet the picture is more complicated than it
ﬁrst appears. Under registration, for sex offenses against adults and peeping, pornography,
and prostitution offenses, neighborhoods with additional RSOs are safer than comparable
neighborhoods. Post-notiﬁcation, these neighborhoods remain safer than comparable
neighborhoods, but by a smaller margin. For forcible rape and sex offenses against children,
however, the pattern runs in the opposite direction. Additional RSOs in a neighborhood
have no relationship or a slightly positive relationship with the frequency of these crimes
under a registration regime, but notiﬁcation appears to reduce these risks signiﬁcantly,
leaving neighborhoods with RSOs, again, safer than comparable neighborhoods.
We interpret these empirical patterns through a conceptual framework that recognizes that NonRSOs (potential or ﬁrst-time offenders) commit most sex crime and that sex
offender laws (like notiﬁcation) can indirectly affect the spatial offending patterns of these
individuals. We use our conceptual framework to present hypotheses for why the particular
patterns in the data may make sense. Our conceptual model also highlights other concerns
that we attempt to address in our empirical work, including the possibility of a nonlinear
relationship between the number of RSOs and victimization risk in a neighborhood,
spillovers across neighborhoods, and alternative deﬁnitions of neighborhoods.
An important caveat to our conclusions is that we study reported crime, not actual
crime. While we are one step ahead of analyses that focus on arrests, our crime data do not
represent the true, underlying numbers of crimes and so our victimization risk measures
are necessarily inaccurate. Moreover, sex offender laws have the potential to affect reporting behaviors. After learning that an RSO lives nearby, an individual may become more apt
to report a suspicious man in the playground; if a local RSO leads parents to discuss
how to deal with sexual abuse with their children, those children may be more
likely to report something unusual. Once an individual learns that a single RSO resides in
her neighborhood, it may not matter how many additional RSOs live in the neighborhood
if that potential victim is able to fully protect herself.
In the end, the key descriptive ﬁndings that emerge from our neighborhood analysis
are (1) that risk of victimization appears at worst unrelated to the close proximity of an RSO,
and (2) that making the identity and location of RSOs public has the potential to increase
the likelihood of reported sex offenses in the neighborhoods in which RSOs live, with
forcible rape and sex offenses against children as potential exceptions. Both patterns are
quite surprising given the seemingly commonsense and intuitive assumption that living
near an RSO has simply got to make the risk of becoming a victim higher, not lower, and the
equally natural idea that notifying the public of where RSOs live can only make their
neighbors safer. Our ﬁndings also raise important questions for future research, including
why sex offense victimization risk appears to increase with respect to some types of crime
when notiﬁcation publicly identiﬁes RSOs, and how policymakers should respond to this
unexpected possibility.
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